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Resumo 
 
Este artigo analisa a relação entre a cobertura de analistas, erros de previsão e gerenciamento de resultados. 
Confirma o papel de analistas como Gatekeepers, ao demonstrar que os analistas estimulam a transparência e 
inibem o gerenciamento de resultados. Para a cobertura dos analistas utilizou-se a base de dados da I/B/E/S, onde 
também foram coletadas informações relativas às projeções de consenso dos analistas para companhias abertas 
brasileiras. Os resultados indicaram existir uma correlação negativa entre o número de analistas e a magnitude 
dos accruals discricionários em termos absolutos, indicando que a cobertura de analista inibe o gerenciamento 
de resultados. Verificou-se também uma correlação negativa entre a cobertura de analistas e os erros de previsão, 
identificando que quando uma empresa é acompanhada com um número grande de analistas, a previsão de seu 
consenso  é  mais  precisa  e  acurada.  Na  analise  multivariada  as  regressões  estatisticamente  satisfatórias 
evidenciaram resultados significativos no mesmo sentido. Os analistas do mercado, apesar das severas críticas 
que recebem da imprensa especializada, na realidade têm um efeito positivo sobre a governança corporativa, por 
monitorar a gestão e inibir o gerenciamento de resultados. 
 
Palavras-chave:  cobertura  de  analistas;  gerenciamento  de  resultados;  previsão  de  resultados;  governança 
corporativa.  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship of analysts’ coverage,  forecasting errors and earnings  management. It 
corroborates the role of analysts as gatekeepers by finding that analysts enhance transparency and reduce the 
scope of earnings management. To identify analysts’ coverage we used the I/B/E/S, from where we also obtained 
information on the consensus projections of analysts for listed Brazilian companies. The results indicated a 
negative correlation between the number of analysts covering firms and the magnitude of their discretionary 
accruals in absolute terms, indicating that more scrutiny inhibits earnings management. We also found a negative 
correlation  between  analysts’  coverage  and  forecasting  errors.  Multivariate  regressions  showed  statistically 
significant results in the same sense. Therefore, market analysts, despite the severe criticism they receive from 
the specialized press, actually have a beneficial effect on corporate governance by monitoring managers and 
inhibiting earnings management. 
 
Key words: analysts’ coverage; earnings management; earnings forecasts; corporate governance. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The  increasing  importance  of  stock  markets,  together  with  considerable  participation  in 
financial markets by small investors, has resulted in a remarkable increase in the production and 
consumption of financial information. Many investors rely on the recommendations of capital market 
analysts  to  choose  their  portfolios  because  of  the  analysts’  greater  market  expertise  and  specific 
knowledge about the companies they follow. Analysts are arguably the eyes and ears of the market.  
Whether  working  independently  or  for  financial  institutions  or  brokerage  houses,  market 
analysts pay close attention to the obligatory and voluntary information disclosed by firms. Based on 
this information, they make predictions about future results, employing a particular valuation model, 
define a target price for a stock and recommend buying, selling or holding it. For most investors who 
rely on analysts, this opinion is the most important function of analysts. 
Market analysts act as intermediaries by following public companies and preparing earnings 
projections and investment recommendations. There are various reasons that justify their work, among 
which their role as gatekeepers stands out, a role by which they reduce the information asymmetry 
between  investors  and  management.  Recently  analysts  have  come  under  withering  fire  from  the 
specialized press. They have been accused of being unable to predict corporate governance scandals 
and, what is worse, of encouraging or motivating questionable earnings management practices. 
Although  listed firms  are required  to  disclose  information  periodically  to  the  market,  these 
financials  can  be  very  complex  and  not  all  users  are  sophisticated  enough  to  understand  their 
implications. Based on this context, the focus of this study is to identify the association of analysts’ 
coverage with forecasting errors and earnings management in Brazil. Does the number of analysts 
covering  a  firm  influence  its  propensity  to  engage  in  earnings  management?  To  what  extent  do 
analysts  serve  to  monitor  managers,  discouraging  them  from  opportunistic  behavior  in  disclosing 
financial information? 
Another question investigated is whether the magnitude of forecasting errors is correlated with 
the number of analysts covering a company. By hypothesis, we consider that as the number of analysts 
increases, the information asymmetry will decline, enabling better earnings projections. We focus on 
analysts’ consensus, or street consensus, defined as the average of the earnings projections for a firm 
in a determined period. Analysis of the consensus projection is based on the idea that a representation 
of market expectations can be obtained by a measure of the central tendency of the distribution of 
analysts’ projections. 
Our objective is to answer these questions in the context of Brazil, to offer additional support to 
clarify points not yet conclusively resolved in the international literature. Market analysts can play a 
valuable role in improving corporate governance while at the same time providing their projections on 
future  earnings.  These  projections  make  it  possible  to  estimate  a  key  variable  in  stock  valuation 
models. Identifying good projections of future earnings is a prerequisite for an adequate measurement 
of the fair price of a stock. 
This paper is organized into five sections, including this introduction. In the next section, we 
present the theoretical framework; and in the third section we discuss the methodologies followed, 
such as the empirical proxies for analysts’ coverage, earnings management and forecasting errors, 
along with the nature of the studies conducted. The results are analyzed in the fourth section, and our 
conclusions are presented in the fifth section. 
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Literature Review 
 
 
The study of financial analysts is a hot topic in finance, according to Ramnath, Rock and Shane 
(2008). Since 1992, at least 250 papers related to financial analysts have appeared in nine major 
research journals. 
Figure  1  provides  a  simple  schematic  to  capture  the  focus  of  these  studies.  The  analyst 
information  process  begins  with  availability  of  public  information  such  as  firm  strategies,  the 
competitive landscape, financial data and other nonfinancial factors. Armed with this information, 
analysts  employ  their  skills  to  analyze  various  data  and  derive  quantifier  expectations  of  future 
earnings. The analysts then use their skills to process these earnings forecasts into firm valuations 
which, when compared to the current stock price, result in a justifiable stock recommendation that is 
released to investors. 
 
Figure 1. Analyst Information Processing. 
Source:  Adapted  from  Martinez,  A.  (2004).  Analisando  os  analistas:  estudo  empírico  das  projeções  de  lucros  e  das 
recomendações dos analistas do mercado de capitais para as  empresas brasileiras de capital aberto (p. 16). (Doctoral 
dissertation). Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, SP, Brazil.  
The  investigation  of  analysts´  recommendations  performance  is  a  well  established  line  of 
research in Finance. Many authors have investigated whether analysts’ recommendations are of value 
to investors. As far back as the 1930s, Cowles (1933) documented that analysts’ recommendations do 
not produce abnormal returns. Davies and Canes (1978) investigated buy and sell recommendations 
published  in  the  Wall  Street  Journal´s  Heard  on  the  Street  column  in  1970  and  1971,  detecting 
abnormal price movements on the day of publication and the following day. They also observed a 
much stronger reaction to recommendations to sell compared with recommendations to buy. Later, 
with the same research design, Beneish (1991) for the years 1978 and 1979, and Liu, Smith and Syed 
(1990) for the period 1982-85, supported Davies and Canes finding.  
Barber and Loeffer (1993) investigated the effects of stock recommendations published in the 
monthly Dartboard column of the Wall Street Journal on the behavior of security prices and trading 
volumes  from  October  1988  to  October  1990.  The  authors  found  positive  abnormal  returns  of 
approximately four percent and an average trading volume that was double the normal for the two 
days  following  publication,  concluding  that  the  positive  abnormal  return  was  the  result  of  naïve 
buying  pressure  (the  price  pressure  hypothesis)  as  well  as  the  information  content  of  analysts´ 
recommendations (the information content hypothesis).  
In turn, Womack (1996), using a real-time (first-call) data on recommendations by 14 large 
brokerages, identified an excess return on the announcement of a buy recommendation that persisted 
up to one month afterward. However, the author found significantly negative returns for six month 
following sell recommendations and no significant abnormal returns after a buy recommendation. In 
contrast, Barber, Lehavy, Mcnichols, and Trueman (2001) investigated the performance of consensus 
forecasts from the Zacks database for 1985-1996. They found that a portfolio formed of the most 
Information 
(i.e.     Strategy      ,     competition 
Financial  Statements  . 
Management   quality  ,   etc.  ) 
Information 
Processing 
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highly recommended shares had excess returns of 4.2%. Nevertheless, when transaction costs were 
considered these strategies led to non-significant abnormal returns. 
In a recent paper, Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler and Agarwal (2009) tested whether sell-side 
analysts are prone to behavioural errors when making stock recommendations, as well as the impact of 
investment  banking  relationships  on  their  judgments.  The  authors  found  first  that  new  buy 
recommendations on average had no investment value, whereas new sell recommendations did, and 
take time to be assimilated by the market. They also showed that new buy recommendations are 
distinguished from new sells both by the level of analyst optimism and representativeness bias as well 
as with increased conflicts of interest.  
Even though most of the research has been conducted in US Markets, similar investigations 
have been carried out in most developed countries. Pieper, Schierek and Weber (1993) investigated 
buy recommendations published in the Effekten-Spiegel for 1990 and 1991 in the German Stock 
Market, concluding that abnormal returns could only be realized by buying the stock prior to the 
publication  of  the  recommendation.  Schmid  and  Zimmermann  (2003)  investigated  the  price  and 
volume behavior of Swiss stocks concerning buy, sell and hold recommendations, as published in the 
major financial newspaper in Switzerland. They found significant price reaction for the week that the 
recommendations were published. In a different context, Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) evaluated the 
value of analysts´ recommendations in the G7 countries (i.e., Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, Japan and the United States), observing a significant reaction of stock prices to recommendation 
revisions in all countries except Italy. 
There  have  also  been  several  studies  in  emerging  stock  markets,  such  as  David  (2007), 
examining  the  changes  in  average  returns  and  standard  deviations  of  stocks  that  people  were 
recommended to buy, by analysts in the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange, Israel. The findings show a large 
increase in the returns and a significant decrease in the standard deviations in the time span before the 
publication of the recommendation. After publication, however, there is a slight addition to the return 
accompanied by a large increase in the standard deviation. Likewise, Erdogan, Palmon, and Yezegel 
(2011) conducted a study on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. They claimed that the stocks quoted in the 
capital market, which are recommended by analysts, did not show superior stock return ability for both 
the short and long term performance of the analysts’ recommendations. 
Kumar,  Chakrapani,  Nikhil,  and  Bang  (2009)  studied  the  impact  of  buy  and  sell 
recommendations issued by analysts on the stock prices of companies listed on the National Stock 
Exchange (NSE) of India. The study found that buy recommendations issued by analysts on public 
domains helped investors to generate abnormal returns on the day of the recommendation. On the 
other hand, sell recommendations did not show significant negative abnormal returns. Lin and Kuo 
(2007) found that there are significant positive abnormal returns before and on the day of the analysts’ 
recommendations  on  the  Taiwanese  Stock  Exchange.  However,  when  the  transaction  costs  are 
accounted for, the returns become insignificant. 
To sum up, the literature in general indicates that certain analysts really can outperform the 
market, and hence their recommendations are of value to investors. The big challenge facing investors, 
therefore,  is  to  identify  the  analysts  whose  recommendations  are  really  valid.  The  literature  has 
demonstrated a serious analyst optimistic bias since in general buy recommendations outnumber sell 
recommendations.  However  following  analysts´  recommendations  does  not  in  general  provide 
abnormal risk-adjusted returns, with the possible exception of selling recommendations. This review 
shows that the literature is divided in its opinions about whether analysts’ recommendations have an 
impact on stock prices or not.  
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Analysts’ Coverage, Earnings Management and Forecasting Errors 
 
 
Given the richness of the literature on analysts, we narrowed our discussions to the role of 
analysts in earnings management. 
According to Elgers, Lo and Pfeiffer (2001), more coverage by analysts is generally associated 
with greater stock pricing efficiency from the publicly available information. In turn, according to 
Houston,  Lev  and Trucker  (2008), the  number  of analysts that follow  a  given  firm  is  negatively 
associated with asymmetric information between the firm and investors. Therefore, the intensity of 
analysts’ coverage has often been used as a proxy for the quality of the information disclosed by firms 
(Louis & Robinson, 2005). 
On  the  relationship  of  analysts  with  earnings  management,  the  literature  has  presented 
conflicting conclusions. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) related two types of earnings management to 
errors in analysts’ earnings projections: taking a bath, when the projections are not reached, and 
income-increasing, when earnings are adjusted up to analysts’ forecasts. In other studies, Bradshaw, 
Richardson  and  Sloan  (2001)  and  Ahmed,  Nainar  and  Zhou  (2005)  demonstrated  that  analysts 
generally do not differentiate between discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. However, there is 
evidence to the contrary, indicating that analysts aggressively downgrade their opinions of firms when 
they perceive that managers are artificially managing earnings. 
S. Brown (2004) examined the association between firms’ financial statements and value and 
found evidence that analysts appear to be aware of the incentives for earnings management. Ke (2001) 
found a negative relation between the number of analysts following a given firm and the probability of 
that firm reporting small increases in profits. These results are consistent in indicating that analysts 
reduce the propensity to manage earnings. Lin and Mcnichols (1998) offered indirect evidence that an 
increase in the number of analysts following a firm is associated with reduced profits from insider 
trading.  In  turn,  Lang,  Karl  and  Miller  (2004)  investigated  the  relationship  between  the  capital 
structure and analysts that follow firms, and found that in general analysts avoid following companies 
with precarious governance structures. 
For Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2008), analysts play an active role in uncovering corporate 
fraud, greater than that played by regulators and auditors. For example, the involvement of analysts 
was responsible for the discovery of various cases of corporate fraud in the United States. Finally, Yu 
(2008)  demonstrated  that  an  increase  in  analysts’  coverage  reduces  the  propensity  for  earnings 
management. 
In Brazil, Paulo, Lima and Lima (2006) tested the effect of analysts’ coverage and stated that 
there are no statistically significant differences between firms that are covered and those that are not. 
According  to  these  authors,  the  results  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  managers  of  Brazilian 
companies believe financial analysts are incapable of detecting discretionary practices. 
Given the active participation of analysts in distributing information, it is reasonable to assume 
that managers’ accounting choices do depend to some extent on the intensity of analysts’ coverage. As 
intermediaries  in  the  flow  of  private  information,  analysts  inevitably  detect  some  incorrect 
management practices. This is in line with Jensen and Meckling (1976), who in their classic article 
argued that analysts reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership from control, 
so that analysts in reality are socially productive. 
The  international  literature  is  almost  unanimous  in  concluding  that  analysts  tend  to  be 
optimistic.  This  optimistic  bias  is  inferred  from  the  finding  that  there  is  a  consistently  negative 
difference between real and projected earnings. In other words, analysts’ forecasted earnings are on 
the whole higher than the results actually obtained. This optimism has been documented in studies 
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vary according to the study, due to the different methodologies employed, definition of the variables 
and period under study. 
Lim (2001), using the average quarterly earnings estimates, found an optimism of 0.94% of the 
price. The bias was considerably higher, at 2.5%, for small cap firms, but only 0.53% of the price for 
large cap ones. He also observed a pervasive bias in every market and all years. Richardson, Teoh and 
Wysocki (1999) used individual analysts’ projections and projection errors and found that although the 
positive bias continued to exist, there was a substantial decline, from 0.91% to 0.09% of the price, 
when the projection horizon was reduced from one year to one month. In turn, L. Brown (1998) 
observed that the bias in recent years has appeared to have shifted from optimism to pessimism, or at 
least to virtually no bias. 
For analysts of Brazilian firms, an optimistic bias was also documented by Franco (2002) and 
Martinez (2004). Both authors, despite using different methods and databases and examining different 
problems, found the existence of optimism in the earnings projections for Brazilian firms. 
According to Kothari (2001), the factors determining the optimistic bias in analysts’ earnings 
predictions fall into two general categories: (a) economic incentives and (b) behavioral cognitive bias. 
Another coherent explanation was offered by Trueman (1994), who concluded that analysts tend to 
imitate their peers (herd behavior), seeking to follow the consensus. He demonstrated with elegant 
mathematical models that analysts tend to make projections similar to previous expectations, even 
when the information is different. 
The number of analysts who follow a particular firm can vary widely. Some companies can 
have over 20 analysts making projections about their future earnings, while for others the number is 
very small. In this context, it is reasonable to expect accuracy to improve with a greater number of 
analysts, based on the assumption that they have a greater volume of information on the firm, and that 
the portfolio effect (reduced dispersion) improves the quality of the consensus estimation. 
Given the richness of the literature on analysts, we narrowed our discussion to the role of 
analysts  in  earnings  management.  Are  the  analysts  gatekeepers,  so  that  they  curb  earnings 
management?  Or  do  analysts  balance  different  pressures  and  collude  with  management,  thereby 
compromising  their  objectivity?  The  view  that  analysts  succumb  to  pressure  from  management 
suggests that, overall, analysts are weak gatekeepers. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Database 
 
To relate the performance of analysts with earnings management, we carried out the following 
procedures.  To  study  analysts’  projections,  we  used  the  Institutional  Brokers´  Estimate  System  - 
I/B/E/S  database,  from  which  we  obtained  information  on  the  consensus  projections  for  listed 
Brazilian companies from 1998 to 2004. We then measured their earnings projection error in relation 
to the actual results. We also identified the number of analysts following each firm in order to define 
the variable for analysts’ coverage. 
The I/B/E/S is a service that assembles analysts' estimates of future earnings for thousands of 
publicly traded companies, detailing how many estimates are available for each company and the high, 
low and average estimates for each. Since the 1970s, the I/B/E/S has been the most important supplier 
of earnings forecasts for investment professionals around the world. In this part of the study, we used 
all the firms for which information was available in the database, with no type of selection.  
For our first analysis, we gathered information on analysts’ consensus on earnings per share 
(EPS) for the next year. Among the various metrics available, we found that for EPS forecasts the The Role of Analysts as Gatekeepers   719 
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greatest number of observations were for the current year. This is a key variable based on indicators of 
the equity/earnings type. Unlike the American market, where the majority of forecasts are of quarterly 
results, in Brazil annual predictions are predominant.  
We collected the EPS projections for each year on a monthly basis. The I/B/E/S system contains 
a  monthly  consensus of analysts  based  on all forecasts  until the  month  before  publication  of  the 
results. Therefore, the system records the evolution of analysts’ EPS consensus for a determined year 
until the month before announcement of the results. For the accounting data for capturing earnings 
management, we used the Economática database. 
 
Metric for forecasting errors 
 
As a metric to identify analysts’ performance, we computed the prediction error (PRED_ERR), 
defined as the difference between the real earnings (observed) and the projected earnings (estimated). 
A negative error means a negative surprise or that the actual earnings fell short of the projections. 
Likewise, a positive surprise means that the actual earnings turned out to be better than projected. 
For  purposes  of  comparability,  we  calculated  the  prediction  errors  in  terms  of  actual  EPS. 
Hence, the forecast error for this study is the real minus the predicted EPS divided by the absolute 
value of the real EPS: 
_
actual pred
actual
EPS EPS
PRED ERR
EPS
  (1) 
Where: 
EPS actual = real earnings per share in the period 
EPS pred  = consensus (average) earnings per share forecast in the period 
PRED_ERR  = prediction errors 
We used the absolute value (modulus) in the denominator to precisely capture the direction of 
the  prediction  error.  The  division  by  the  actual  EPS  makes  it  possible  to  compare  the  errors  in 
percentage terms. 
From  a  methodological  standpoint, there are  various  other  measures for scaling  forecasting 
errors. In addition to actual results (observed profit or loss), there are many studies in the international 
literature using errors based on percentages of price per share. However, we believe that considering 
price would bring distortions into our analysis because the forecasting errors would be measured in 
terms of a factor over which analysts have no control since the share price is determined exogenously 
by the market.  
Likewise, we did not use total assets (or net equity) as a factor to deflate the prediction errors. 
First, we believe total assets could be correlated with forecasting errors in an undesirable manner. Had 
we worked with figures deflated by assets, we would have in essence been measuring an indicator of 
return on assets. Certain business segments have a higher ROA than others. This fact could impair the 
comparison of the forecasting errors that were calculated.  
We recognize, however, that measuring the forecasting error in terms of the actual earnings per 
share  is  not  problem-free.  For  example,  for  firms  with  earnings  near  zero,  the  errors  were 
exaggeratedly large, and of course we had to exclude observations for which the earnings were nil 
because of the impossibility of dividing by zero.  
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Metric for earnings management 
 
Most  research  shows  that  discretionary  accruals  are  the  main  mechanism  employed  by 
accountants  and  managers  to  manage  earnings.  Examples  are  Jones  (1991);  Dechow,  Sloan  and 
Sweeney  (1995);  Kang  and  Sivaramakrishnan  (1995)  and  Martinez  (2001).  Irrespective  of  the 
methodological  focus  (discretionary  accruals  or  descriptive-inferential  statistics),  all  these  authors 
have investigated the manipulation of accounting numbers through accounting choices. 
For the empirical estimate of earnings management we used the model developed by Kang and 
Silvaramakrishnan (1995) to estimate discretionary accruals (Paulo, Lima, & Lima, 2006). The proxies 
for earnings management used in this study were thus discretionary accruals (AB_ACCit) calculated by 
the KS model, where total accruals are calculated as follows: 
1
t t t t t
t
t
Depr CA CCE CL Debt
TA A
  (2) 
Where: 
TAt = total accruals (operational) of the firm in period t; 
∆CAt = variation of current assets of the firm from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t; 
∆CLt = variation of current liabilities of the firm from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t; 
∆CCEt = variation of cash and cash equivalents of the firm from the end of period t-1 to the end 
of period t; 
∆Debtt = variation of short-term loans and financings of the firm from the end of period t-1 to 
the end of period t; 
Deprt = amount of depreciation recorded by the firm during period t; 
At-1 = Total assets at the end of period t-1. 
The discretionary accruals of a firm in period t were calculated as follows: 
_ t t t AB ACC TA NDA   (3) 
Where:    
AB_ACCt  = discretionary accruals of the company in period t; 
TAt = total accruals of the firm in period t; 
NDAt = non-discretionary accruals of the firm in period t; 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) proposed a model (KS model) to measure accruals and 
earnings management in the following form: 
1 2 3 0 1 2 3 it it it it it OE TA R PPE   (4) 
Where: 
TAit =total accruals of firm i in period t, weighted by total assets at the end of period t-1; 
Rit = net revenues of firm i in period t, weighted by total assets at the end of period t-1; 
OEit = amount of operating expenses of firm i in period t, excluding expenses for depreciation 
and amortization, weighted by total assets at the end of period t-1; The Role of Analysts as Gatekeepers   721 
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PPEit = balance of gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of period t,  
δ1 = ARi,t-1 / Ri,t-1; 
δ2 = (Invi,t-1 + PrepExpi,t-1+ CPi,t-1) / Di,t-1; 
δ3 = Depri,t-1 / PPEi,t-1; 
ARi-1t = balance of accounts receivable from customers of firm i in period t-1; 
Ri,t-1 = net operating revenues of firm i in period t-1; 
Inv i,t-1 = balance of inventories of firm i in period t-1; 
PrepExp i,t-1 = balance of prepaid expenses of firm i in period t-1; 
AP i,t-1 = balance of short-term accounts payable of firm i in period t-1; 
Depr i,t-1  = amount of expenses for depreciation and amortization of firm i in period t-1; 
PPEi,t-1 = balance of gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of period t-1; 
εit = regression error. 
As above, all the variables here are weighted by the total assets at the end of period (year) t-1. 
The estimated value of discretionary accruals can be calculated directly by the regression error. 
The KS model uses the instrumental variables method to estimate the regression parameters.  
The discretionary accruals (AB_ACC) are computed as the residual of equation 4, as follows – 
equation (5):  
1 2 3 0 1 2 3 _ it it it it it AB ACC TA OE R PPE   (5) 
Conceptually, a positive value of AB_ACC means the firm is managing its earnings to increase 
them, while a negative value means it is doing so to reduce them. 
For  analysis  of the  results, we  preferred to work with the  proxies in terms  of absolute  value. 
Therefore, for the majority of the analyses we used the modulus of the forecast error (ABS_ERR) and 
of the discretionary accruals (ABS_ACC). The closer these are to zero, the smaller are the forecasting 
error  and  earnings  management,  while  the  larger  they  are,  the  greater  the  forec asting  error  and 
earnings management, independent of whether there was, respectively, a negative or positive surprise 
and upward or downward earnings management. 
 
 
Analysis of the Results  
 
 
Before  presenting  the  results,  we  should  explain  some  descriptive  statistics  of  the  main 
empirical proxies. Table 1, Panel A, shows there were 5,554 observations. Each observation is a 
consensus prediction by analysts for a particular firm in a determined month. 
The average number of analysts covering the firms in our sample was 9.12, with the range being 
from 2 to 34. Because this coverage can vary significantly among the firms, we divided the firms into 
classes according to the number of analysts following them. 
To define the number of analysts monitoring a determined firm, we checked how many analysts 
participated in reaching the consensus projection. The average forecasting error (PRED_ERR) of the A. L. Martinez                                                  722 
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observations confirms the hypothesis widely stated in the international literature of optimistic bias. 
The average of the forecasting errors is -0.41. The negative result indicates a negative surprise, i.e., 
that the earnings projected by analysts were greater than the real result. 
To measure earnings management, we used the metric AB_ACC, which represents discretionary 
accruals (or abnormal accruals). This metric ranges from negative for companies that manage earnings 
less to positive for those that manage them more. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows some statistics, separated into classes representing the number of 
analysts covering the firms in the sample. Class 1 represents firms followed by two or three analysts, 
while firms in Class 2 are covered by four to six analysts, those in Class 3 by seven to eleven and 
those in Class 4 by more than eleven analysts. 
There are significant differences in terms of the average of absolute discretionary accruals and 
absolute forecasting errors among the classes. For example, for the firms in Class 4 there is a smaller 
propensity for earnings management and the consensus forecasts are more accurate in comparison 
with those in Class 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Variables 
  N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Stand. Dev. 
NUM_ANAL  5,554  2.00  34.00  9.12  6.29 
PRED_ERR  5,554  -366.50  66.00  -0.41  12.94 
AB_ACC  5,554  -0.41  0.46  0.01  0.10 
ABS_ERR  5,554  0.00  366.50  1.86  12.81 
ABS_ACC  5,554  0.00  0.46  0.07  0.08 
Panel B: Variables by Analysts Classes 
  CLASSES 
Total 
  1  2  3  4 
NUM Observations  1,383  1,178  1,085  1,908  5,554 
NUM_ANAL Mean  2.39  4.98  8.84  16.70  9.12 
ABS_ACC Mean  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.07 
ABS-ERR Mean  2.43  2.61  1.84  0.98  1.86 
To  further  our  research,  we  computed  the  Spearman  correlation  coefficient  between  the 
variables. The results are shown in Table 2. This test indicates there is a negative and significant 
correlation between the number of analysts and the magnitude of discretionary accruals in absolute 
terms (-0.119), which is in the direction expected. In other words, this confirms the hypothesis that as 
the number of analysts following a firm increases, the propensity for earnings management decreases.  
Furthermore, there is also a negative and significant correlation between the number of analysts 
following a firm and the earnings forecast errors (-0.142), indicating that when more analysts follow a 
company, their consensus earnings predictions are more accurate.  
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Table 2 
 
Correlation Analysis 
 
      NUM_ANAL  PRED_ERR  AB_ACC  ABS_ERR  ABS_ACC 
Spearman’s 
rho 
NUM_ANAL  Coeff. 
Correlation  1.0  -,096
**  ,044
**  -,142
**  -,119
** 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .  .000  .001  .000  .000 
PRED_ERR  Coeff. 
Correlation  -,096
**  1.000  -,134
**  ,239
**  ,065
** 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .  .000  .000  .000 
AB_ACC  Coeff. 
Correlation  ,44
**  -,134
**  1.000  -,125
**  ,193
** 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .001  .000  .  .000  .000 
ABS_ERR  Coeff. 
Correlation  -,142
**  ,239
**  -,125
**  1.000  ,041
** 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .000  .000  .  .002 
ABS_ACC  Coeff. 
Correlation  -,119
**  ,065
**  ,193
**  ,041
**  1.000 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .000  .000  .002  . 
Note. ** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
An  interesting  result  of  this  analysis  is  the  positive  correlation  between  ABS_ERR  and 
ABS_ACC, indicating that the forecasting errors accompany earnings management. In other words, 
earnings  management  might  be  one  of  the  factors  explaining  analysts’  forecasting  errors.  To 
investigate  this  situation  further,  we  formulated  Table  3,  showing  the  cross-tabulation  of  the 
companies practicing earnings management, divided into income increasing and income decreasing 
ones, with the possible forecasting errors, respectively positive and negative surprises.  
The cross-referenced results fall into four quadrants: I) ABS_ACC<0 and PRED_ERR<0; II) 
ABS_ACC<0 and PRED_ERR>0; III) ABS_ACC>0 and PRED_ERR<0 and IV)ABS_ACC>0 and 
PRED_ERR>0.  
Table  3 shows several  intriguing  results.  First,  the quadrant containing  the  highest  average 
ABS_ACC (0.084) is IV, indicating that the companies in this group might be managing their earnings 
upward (income increasing) to meet or exceed analysts’ expectations, to ensure a positive surprise. 
This is compatible with the argument that companies in some contexts can manage earnings to meet 
analysts’ projections or surprise the market because of the positive effect this can have on the stock 
price.  
In  quadrant  I,  that  with  the  fewest  observations,  the  average  of  the  prediction  errors 
(ABS_ERR) is the highest among all the quadrants (3.17). The firms in this quadrant practice income 
decreasing earnings management and negatively surprise the market. A possible explanation for this 
situation is that firms that realize they will not meet analysts’ projections anyway may opt for “take a 
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Table 3 
 
Cross-Tabulated Matrix of Earnings Management and Forecasting Error by Classes 
 
  Analysts Forecast Errors 
Total 
Earnings 
Management 
CLASSES 
Negative Surprise 
PRED_ERR<0 
Positive Surprise 
PRED_ERR>0 
N 
ABS_ACC 
Mean 
ABS_ERR 
Mean 
N 
ABS_ACC 
Mean 
ABS_ERR 
Mean 
N 
ABS_ACC 
Mean 
ABS_ERR 
Mean 
Income 
Decreasing 
AB_ACC<0 
1  235  0.035  4.41  519  0.072  1.71  754  0.060  2.56 
2  193  0.057  6.65  340  0.060  1.39  533  0.059  3.29 
3  163  0.055  1.31  318  0.050  1.89  481  0.052  1.69 
4  302  0.044  0.99  583  0.059  0.76  885  0.054  0.84 
Partial Total    893  0.046  3.17  1760  0.061  1.37  2653  0.056  1.97 
Income 
Increasing 
AB_ACC>0 
1  263  0.072  4.32  366  0.099  0.82  629  0.088  2.28 
2  219  0.081  4.53  426  0.073  0.78  645  0.076  2.05 
3  251  0.075  2.55  353  0.096  1.55  604  0.087  1.96 
4  488  0.070  1.41  535  0.076  0.84  1023  0.073  1.11 
Partial Total    1221  0.074  2.83  1680  0.084  0.97  2901  0.080  1.75 
Total    2114  0.062  2.97  3440  0.073  1.17  5554  0.069  1.86 
To obtain more robust results, we carried out multivariate analysis by performing the following 
regressions, always with the number of analysts (analysts’ coverage) as an independent variable, to 
explain, respectively, the forecasting errors in absolute terms and the absolute discretionary accruals. 
The linear regression models were: 
ABS_ERR = αo + α1 NUM_ANAL + α2 DAYS + ʵ0   (5) 
Where: 
ABS_ERR : forecasting errors in absolute terms 
NUM_ANAL : number of analysts 
DAYS : days before publication of the financials 
ABS_ACC = βo + β1 NUM_ANAL + β2 SUSPECT + ʵ0   (6) 
Where: 
ABS_ACC : discretionary accruals in absolute terms 
NUM_ANAL : number of analysts 
SUSPECT : companies with positive and vary small forecasting errors (dummy) 
When analyzing the forecasting error, besides the number of analysts we also used a variable to 
indicate the timing of the prediction. Our hypothesis was that the longer the forecast was made (in 
days) before the publication of the results, the greater the forecasting errors would tend to be. 
Evidence of this hypothesis would be a negative coefficient for NUM_ANAL and a positive one for 
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For the model of discretionary accruals, besides the number of analysts, we used a dummy to 
separate the companies suspected of engaging in earnings management from those not suspected of 
this practice. We classified as suspect companies those with positive and very small forecasting errors. 
The premise is that companies manage earnings to meet analysts’ expectations, a hypothesis verified 
in the literature (Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckauser, 1999). 
The results are shown in Table 4. The regressions proved statistically adequate. It can be seen 
that  the  forecasting  errors  tend  to  decline  as  the  number  of  analysts  increases.  The  variable 
NUM_ANAL was negative and significant (t-statistic of -3.896), indicating that the more analysts that 
follow a firm, the smaller the forecasting error is in absolute terms, meaning the more accurate the 
prediction.  
For earnings management, the regression results were also statistically significant, showing that 
the propensity of firms to manage earnings declines with greater coverage by analysts, as shown by 
the negative and significant coefficient of the number of analysts (t-statistic of -3.846). 
 
Table 4 
 
Regression Analysis 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable – Absolute Forecasting Errors 
ABS_ERR=αo + α1 NUM_ANAL + α2 DAYS + ʵ0 
  Coefficients  Standart 
Coefficients 
t  Sig.  Model  B  Std. Error  Beta 
1   (Constant)  1,835  ,415    4,419  0,00 
  NUM_ANAL  -,106  ,027  -,052  -3,896  0,00 
  DAYS  ,005  ,001  ,048  3,618  0,00 
a.  Dependant Variable: ABS_ERR  R  R Square  Adjusted R 
Square  F  Sig. 
Model Statistics  ,391  ,153  ,149  14,745  ,000 
 
Panel B: Dependant Variable – Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
ABS_ACC = βo + β1 NUM_ANAL + β2 SUSPECT + ʵ0 
  Coefficients  Standart 
Coefficients 
t  Sig.  Model  B  Std. Error  Beta 
2  (Constant)  ,074  ,002    39,301  ,000 
  NUM_ANAL  ,001  ,000  -,052  -3,846  ,000 
  SUSPECT  ,008  ,004  ,028  2,093  ,036 
a.  Dependant Variable: ABS_ACC  R  R Square  Adjusted  R 
Square  F  Sig. 
Model Statistics  ,363  ,132  ,128  8,917  ,000 
The adjusted R
2 was satisfactory in all cases, but to provide further evidence of the robustness 
of the statistics of the estimated models, we also carried out additional tests (not shown in the tables): 
(a) the Jarque-Bera normality test (JB), which indicated that the residuals were normally distributed; 
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and  (c)  the  Breusch-Godfrey  test  (BG),  showing  no  autocorrelation  of  the  residuals.  Finally,  we 
performed one more robustness test by segregating the observations between the two extreme classes 
of firms: Class 1, covering firms followed by two or three analysts, and Class 4, including firms 
covered by more than eleven analysts. In addition, we ran regressions including size and return on 
asset as control variables, but the results did not improve, so they are not reported in the tables. 
The forecasting error is significantly higher for firms in Class 1 than in Class 4. This indicates 
that analysts’ coverage is an important factor when it comes to explaining differences in the likelihood 
of committing forecasting errors. Likewise, firms in Class 1 tend to manage earnings more than those 
in Class 4, indicating that greater analyst coverage discourages earnings management. We submitted 
the  differences  between  classes  with  respect  to  prediction  errors  and  discretionary  accruals  to 
parametric and nonparametric tests. In all the tests, the differences between these two classes indicated 
that as the average number of analysts rises, the prediction errors and earnings management decline.  
 
Table 5 
 
Parametric and Nonparametric Tests of the Differences between Class 1 and Class 4 
 
Panel A: Statistics for Class 1 (2 or 3 analysts) and Class 4 (more than 11 analysts)   
CLASSE  N  Mean  Stand. Dev  Stand. Error             
NUM_ANAL  1.00  1,383  2.39  .49  .01           
  4.00  1,908  16.70  3.54  .08           
ABS_ERR  1.00  1,383  2.43  17.04  .46           
  4.00  1,908  .98  2.26  .05           
ABS_ACC  1.00  1,383  .07  .07  .00           
  4.00  1,908  .06  .08  .00           
                     
Panel B: Parametric Tests of Differences of Means   
    Levene’s Test  t-test for equals means 
                  95% Confidence 
Interval 
    F  Sig  t  df  Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Differ. 
Stand. 
Dev. 
Differ. 
Low  High 
NUM_ANAL  Equal ˃
2  1703.32  .00  -149.26  3289.00  .00  -14.31  .10  -14.50  -14.12 
Non Equal ˃
2  -174.25  2006.71  .00  -14.31  .08  -14.47  -14.15 
ABS_ERR  Equal ˃
2  31.63  .00  3.67  3289.00  .00  1.45  .39  .67  2.22 
Non Equal ˃
2  3.14  1417.30  .00  1.45  .46  .54  2.35 
ABS_ACC  Equal ˃
2  7.68  .01  2.98  3289.00  .00  .01  .00  .00  .01 
Non Equal ˃
2  3.06  3207.95  .00  .01  .00  .00  .01 
                     
Panel C: Non Parametric Tests of the Differences of Means by Classes   
  NUM_ANAL  ABS_ERR  ABS_ACC               
Chi-Square  5179.41  128.15  75.45               
df  3.00  3.00  3.00               
Asymp. Sig.  .00  .00  .00               
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Conclusions 
 
 
In this paper, we investigated the role of analysts’ coverage as a mechanism to reduce earnings 
management and improve consensus earnings forecasts. The results indicated that in the Brazilian 
context,  companies  covered  by  more  analysts  are less likely  to  manage  earnings,  and that as the 
number of analysts increases, the consensus forecasts become more accurate.  
The results can be summarized by the hypotheses investigated, as follows in Table 6: 
 
Table 6  
 
Results of the Study 
 
The Role of Analysts as 
Gatekeepers 
The greater the number of analysts that follow a firm, the lower the likelihood of 
earnings management. 
A  negative  correlation  was  found  between  analysts’  coverage  and  forecasting 
errors. 
The study corroborates the role of analysts as gatekeepers by finding that analysts 
enhance transparence and reduce the scope of discretionary accruals. 
These  findings  were  confirmed  by  various  statistical  procedures,  both  univariate  and 
multivariate tests, as well as by segmenting the observations into different classes of firms according 
to the number of analysts that follow them and then performing parametric and nonparametric tests. 
All of these tests indicated the results are robust. 
Intuitively, coverage by more analysts should enhance the information environment by reducing 
information asymmetry between management and investors. In particular, our results focus on one of 
the sources of reduced asymmetry: the greater the number of analysts following a firm, the less 
earnings management there will be.  
In other words, analysts not only facilitate distribution of information, they also affect the 
corporate production of information. One of the negative consequences of earnings management is 
increased information asymmetry because this behavior masks the company’s real financial situation. 
Users of accounting information (investors, regulators, shareholders and analysts) can make decisions 
based on financial statements that do no depict the real situation. 
The problem of earnings management is that it changes the risk perception of investors. If a firm 
manages it earnings upward, investors will be led to believe the firm is doing better than it really is. 
Firms can also manage earnings downward to soften the volatility of returns and perhaps “save for a 
rainy day” so to speak, making an upwards adjustment easier in the future.  
The upshot is that the earnings and other financial figures reported, while certainly having 
informational value, cannot be interpreted without a grain of salt. A case-by-case analysis is necessary 
to determine whether a firm is managing its earnings, how and in what direction. 
One  of  the  difficulties  of  this  type  of  research  is  the  lack  of  available  data  to  estimate 
discretionary accruals. Another critical factor that influences analysis of earnings management is the 
heterogeneity  of  the  sample,  for  instance  if  it  is  composed  of  commercial  firms  and  financial 
institutions, which can cast doubt on the results. 
Another problem that might undermine the conclusions reached here is possible errors in the 
data contained in the I/B/E/S system, from where we obtained the earnings forecast. If this database 
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enjoys a good international reputation and data from its system are widely used in academic studies, so 
we believe this possibility is low. 
This study contributes to the debate on the role of analysts in the capital market. Analysts are 
often criticized for producing imprecise forecasts and making bad investment recommendations. But 
our results indicate they play a positive role in corporate governance. Not only do their forecasts 
become more accurate as their coverage increases, the propensity of firms to manage earnings also 
falls, indicating that analysts play an important gatekeeper role. 
While we believe the results demonstrate a statistically significant association between analysts 
coverage on the one hand and earnings management and earnings prediction accuracy on the other, we 
cannot rule out the possible endogeneity between analysts’ coverage and earnings management or 
shortcomings of the metrics used as proxies for the number of analysts, forecasting errors and earnings 
management. 
Still, the findings presented in this paper are important when it comes to clarifying points still 
not conclusively resolved in the international and Brazilian literature. Analysts play a useful role in 
monitoring firms and provided earnings forecasts. These predictions provide a key variable in models 
to evaluate fair stock prices, allowing investors to make more informed decisions. 
In the final analysis, the conclusions of this paper are important for shedding light on the role of 
analysts in corporate governance by monitoring managers and inhibiting earnings management. 
 
Artigo recebido em 29.09.2010. Aprovado em 21.02.2011. 
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